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NEUTRAL CONVOY IN THE WORLD WAR
Visit and search was a peculiarly difficult problem during
the World War, and one which caused much bitter diplomatic
controversy between neutral and belligerent governments. The
difficulties and inconveniences which the exercise of the belliger-
ent right of visit and search now imposes upon neutral commerce
suggest the question whether or not some changes in the rules
governing this right ought to be made. Under the changed
conditions of modern commerce, the exercise of belligerent search
practically forces neutral commerce from the seas. The tre-
mendously increased mercantile tonnage of the present is being'
carried by vessels of constantly increasing tonnage. These great
vessels can not be quickly searched at sea, but must be taken
into belligerent ports for the exercise of the right of search.'
The long delays which this entails is ruinous to shippers, many
of whom found it cheaper to lay up their vessels in port than to
expose them to the hazards of belligerent action.
In view of these changed conditions, which make some modi-
fication of the right of visit and search imperative, it may be
pertinently asked, what has netural convoy to offer as a solution
to this perplexing problem? In seeking an answer to this ques-
tion, an examination of the only actual case of a neutral convoy
in the World War ought to prove helpful
I. HISTORY oF TnE DuTcO CONVOY
The only neutral convoy during the World War was sent
out by the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies Ln July, 1918.
Commerce between Holland and her colonies had all but ceased
by the early months of 1918. The requisitioning in the spring
of that year by the British and American governments of the
Dutch vessels found in their ports was one of the last of a series
of belligerent actions, all instrumental in driving Dutch com-
merce from the seas.
--For this increasingly difficult problem the Dutch govern-
ment had to find some solution. In the spring of 1918 it was
I The United States government, however, contended that it was not
necessary to take the vessels into port for search. Note to the British
government of October 21, 19f5, American Journal of International Law,
Vol. X, Sp. Supp., p. 76.
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confronted with the urgent need of sending several cargoes of
military supplies and government goods to the Netherlands East
Indies. Furthermore, there were several government officials,
together with their families, waiting to be transported to the
colonies. The Minister of Marine decided that the best way out
of the difficulty was the sending of a convoy. It was hoped that
a convoy would serve the double purpose of rendering the trans-
portation reasonably free from danger and, by reason of free-
dom from visit and search whether on the high sea or in belliger-
ent harbors, of guaranteeing a direct and undelayed passage.
In the latter part of April, the Dutch government informed
the governments of Japan, France, Great Britain, and the United
States on the one side, and Germany and Austria-Hungary on
the opposing side of the belligerents of its intention to send this
convoy.2 The Dutch note stated that the convoy would be com-
posed of the following; first, the man-o-war, "Hertog Hendrik,"
accompanied by a collier; secondly, a Dutch merchant ship trans-
formed into a man-o-war according to the rules of the Seventh
Hague Convention of 1907, for the transport of military men
to the Dutch East Indies, and having military supplies as cargo;
and thirdly, a requisitioned Dutch merchant ship, under convoy
of the man-o-war, "Hertog Hendrik," "for the transport of
government passengers with their families and having for cargo
exclusively goods of the Netherlands government destined for
the government of the Dutch East Indies." 3
The note further stated that the loading of all goods and the
embarkation of all passengers would be effected under strict
governmental supervision, that the passengers and their luggage
would be subjected to a strict examination, that no private corre-
spondence would be carried, and that the ships would carry no
mail of any kind. With respect to the government goods it was
declared that the usual manifest would be produced, with certi-
ficates of origin issued by the inspector of import duties.
4
2 The diplomatic correspondence with respect to the convoy is found
in the Dutch White Book, "Diplomatieke Beschiedeiden Betreffende de
Uitzending van een Convooi naar ",ederlandehe Indie." Algemeene
Landsdrukkerij. The Hague, 1918; and in British Pariamentary Papers,
misc. no. 13 (1918), cd. 9028; also found in British State Papers, 1918-
1918, III, p. 533.
3 Dutch White Book, p. 1.
4 Ibid., note 1, British Parl. Paper, note 3.
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The Japanese government in acknowledging the note of the
Dutch government merely stated that the proper Japanese
marine authorities had been informed of the route of the convoy.
The German government requested to be informed of the names
of the vessels that would compose the convoy and. the date of
departure, in order that this information might be sent to the
German naval forces on the high seas. The German govern-
ment further insisted that the convoy would not be guaranteed
immunity unless it remained outside of the forbidden war zones.
The Dutch government replied that it was the intention to have
the convoy remain clear of the forbidden zones.5
Great Britain, as the chief naval power, was naturally more
concerned with the proposed convoy than any of the other bel-
ligerents. Without waiting for official notification of the pro-
posed convoy, it despatched a note to the Dutch government
stating that it could not recognize the right of convoy and that
it would "exercise the belligerents' right of visit and search of
merchant vessels should the Netherlands government carry out
their proposals.''6 Not until after six weeks had elapsed and a
second note had been sent, did the Dutch government receive
any further word from the British government with respect to
the proposed convoy. A note received on June 5 vigorously re-
asserted that the right of visit and search would not be aban-
doned, that Great Britain, had never conceded the claim of
immunity of ships under neutral convoy and that it could not
possibly accede to the Dutch demand.
7
But later that same day the Minister of Blockade, Lord
Robert Cecil, handed the Dutch minister at London a lengthy
confidential memorandum of a different tenor. The British
government regretted the discourteous and imprudent course of
the Netherlands government, and while still refusing to recognize
the right of netural convoy, it would, nevertheless, because of
its friendly disposition toward the Netherlands, go out of its
way to save the susceptibilities of the Dutch government. The
British government was, on the whole, satisfied from the pub-
5 Dutch White Book, p. 1. The governments of Denmark, Norway,
and Spain gave permission for the passage of the convoy through their
waters. The governments of France, the United States and Austria-
Hungary made no reply to the Dutch note. Ibid.
0 Dutch White Book, p. 3, Note 2; Brit. Par. Paper, Note 2.
7 Dutch White Book, p. 3, Note 4; Brit. Par?. Paper, Note 10.
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lished Dutch reports that the Dutch government proposed to
give the belligerents practically the same guarantees and means
of control that they could obtain by exercising the right of
search. However, the British government wanted it clearly
understood that it did not in any way abandon the fundamental
principle that the "repression of contraband and the enforce-
ment of blockade lie, by international law, with the belligerent
alone, and not with the neutral - ," that the right of visit
'and search would be waived in this particular case only as an act
of courtesy, and that it must not be treated as a precedent for
similar concessions in the future.
5
The memorandum then laid down the conditions on which
the proposed convoy would be allowed to make its journey with-
out interference from the British government. These conditions
were substantially the same as those put forward by the Dutch
government, and were as follows:
"A. 'A detailed list of all passengers sailing in the convoy, to be
furnished to His fajesty's Government, none but Dutch Government
officials and their families being allowed to proceed.
"B. Full particulars of the cargo on board any merchant vessel
sailing in the convoy to be supplied in -the same way as is, now done
by the Netherlands Oversea Trust in respect of ships under their
control.
".C. The Netherland Government to give a formal guarantee that
no goods shipped in the convoy are either wholly or in part of enemy
origin.
"D. The ships sailing under the Dutch Naval flag, including the
converted liner, not to carry any civilian passengers nor any goods or
articles other than war-like stores destined tor the -colonial authorities
or forces, of which the complete lists should be furnished.
"E. No mails, correspondence, private papers, printed matter or
parcels to, be carried 'by any ship in the convoy (except official desL-
patches of the Dutch Government).
"F. The -convoy not to sail until the above stipulated particulars
and undertakings -have -been furnished and have Ibeen found satisfac-
tory by the British authorities." *
The Dutch government, in reply, expressed its pleasure at
the mutual agreement as to the mode of carrying out the plan
for the convoy and declared that it was fully aware that the
British government did not recognize the right of convoy, but
that this point of international law could be left out of account
in this case of a very special sort of a convoy serving exclusively
8 Dutch White Book, pp. 4-5; British Parl. Paper, Note 11.
"Dutch White Book, p. 5. Note No. 5. British Part. Papers, Note
No. 11, Enclosure 2.
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in the transportation of government passengers and government
goods from a mother country to her colonies. A complete list
of passengers and full particulars concerning the cargo was
being prepared and would be sent to all the foreign legations
concerned as soon as possible.' 0
In .reply, the British government again reminded the Dutch
government that the conditions under which convoy would be
allowed to sail included the proviso that the British authorities
must be satisfied as to the particular persons and goods to be
shipped and in order to accomplish this it was essential that
British experts in London should examine in detail the lists
and documents furnished. Until these conditions had been ful-
filled the convoy would not'be allowed to sail."
It had originally been intended to have the convoy sail on
the 15th of June, but due to several delays it did not sail until
more than two weeks later. The convoy was to be composed of
four vessels, the man-o-war, "Hertog Hendrick," the auxiliary
cruiser, the "Tabanan," the merchant cruiser, the "Noordam."
and the collier, the "Bengkalis." On June 14th, the manifest
for the "Noordam" was ready and the next day this manifest
covering the merchandise was sent to the legation concerned.
The passenger list, both military and civil, was opened to inspec-
tion on the same day.' 2 On the 17th a list of the goods on board
the "Tabanan" and the "Bengkalis" was sent to the same lega-
tions.
The date for the departure of the convoy had in the mean-
time been set for the 19th, but on the 18th the British govern-
ment presented a note at the Dutch Foreign Office again remind-
ing the Dutch government that the British were waiving the
right of visit and search only on certain conditions, that one of
the conditions was that no goods of enemy origin should be
carried by convoy, and that before the convoy would be allowed
to proceed they must be satisfied. that certain dye-stuffs and
chemicals of German origin, which formed part of the convoy,
could not be furnished from other than German sources.13 The
British government pointed out that it was merely maintaining
ODuth White Book, p. 5. No. 6. British Parl.Paper, Note 13.
u Dutch White Book, p. 5, Note No. 7.
2 Dutch White Book, p. 5, Note No. 8.
Dutch White Book, p. 6. Notes 9 and 10.
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the position taken in a note to the Dutch government on June
23, 1916. In that note the British government took the position
that as regards
"Netherland Government goods (to be sent to the East Indian
Colonfes) of enemy origin, His Majesty's Government are prepared
to waive their wish that shipments should be made only thru the
N. 0. T. (Netherlands Overseas Trust), provided that the Netherland
Government will adopt and put in force the same safe-guards as if
the goods had [been shipped through the agency of the Trust and will
ensure that such goods will not be shipped in excess of normal quan-
tities and will only be shipped in case they can not 'be procured else-
where." 1 4
The Dutch government in a note sent on the following day
contended that the dye-staff could not be placed in the category
of "goods of enemy origin," since in regard to those materials
there had for a long time existed a special arrangement between
the Netherlands and Great Britain.15  Under this arrangement
concluded by the two governments by an exchange of note in
June, 1916. dye-stuffs could be imported into the East Indies
without restriction, up to a maximum amount equal to the
normal pre-war importations. The Dutch government itself
undertook the purchase of the dye-stuffs directly from the Ger-
man dye manufacturers, the materials were consigned to the
governor general of the Dutch East Indies, and the materials
were sold directly by the colonial authorities to the Javanese
colour printers,'6  By this method the re-exportation of the
dye-stuffs was made practically impossible. The Dutch govern-
ment insisted that the British note of April 28, 1918, had made
no change in this arrangement.' 7
On June 19 the British minister at the Hague presented
another memorandum to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs
to the effect that the convoy must not sail before the British
government had received some more definite information in
regard to passengers, cargo, and mails to be sent by the con-
D4flutch White Book, p. 6. Note 11. Already in April, 1918, the
British government had asked for information in regard to the amount
of dye-stuffs that could be procured from other than the belligerent
countries opposed to Great Britain. This informtaion the Dutch gov-
ernment furnished in a note of July 23. Dutch White Book, p. 2.
15 Dutch White Book, p. 6. Note 12.
"Dutch White Book, pp. 6-7. Notes 13 and 14.
"TDutch White Book, p. 6. Note 12.
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voy.'8 in forwarding this information, 19 the Dutch government
took occasion to state that the departure of the convoy was not
dependent upon the permission of any belligerent government,
but that it would, nevertheless, hold up the departure of the
convoy until all differences between the two countries had been
cleared up.
20
All efforts to reach an agreement satisfactory to the British
authorities were unavailing. The British government insisted
that the right of visit and search would not be foregone unless
all the German dye. were excluded from the cargo, and an ex-
plicit assurance was given to the effect that none of the remain-
ing goods. of the cargo were of enemy origin or owed more than
25% of their value to enemy labor or materials.21  In a reply
to this note, the Dutch government gave the required assurance
that with the exception of the dye-stuffs none of the merchandise
on board. ships of the convoy came from countries at war with
Great Britain, nor owed more than 25 % of its value to the labor
or materials of such countries. In regard to the dye-stuffs the
Dutch Government offered to hold up the distribution of the
dye-stuffs after their arrival in India until such time as the dif-
ference of opinion with respect to the applicability of the
arrangement of 1916 should be cleared up.22  The British gov-
ernment refused to accept the proposition of the Dutch govern-
ment and insisted upon the disembarkation of the dye-stuffs as
a condition to the waiving of the right of search. 23 The British
government took the position that "the original arrangement by
which dyes of German origin were allowed to go to the Nether-
land East Indies was contained in Clause 18G of the Nether-
land Overseas Trust agreement, which specifically lays down
that the passage of goods of enemy origin required for factories,
industries or public services in the Dutch Colonies would only
be allowed so long as the goods in question were not procurable
from other sources." One of the definite conditions accepted
by the Dutch government in regard to the convoy was that no
" Dutch White Book, pp. 8-9. Note 15.
"Dutch White Book, pp. 8-9. Note 16.
"Dutch White Book, p. 2.
21 Dutch White Book, p. 9, Note No. 17.
22Dutch White Book, p. 9, Note No. 18.
2 Dutch White Book, p. 9, Note No. 19.
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goods shipped would be either wholly or in part of enemy
origin.2 4
Upon receipt of these notes the Dutch government decided to
remove the dye-stuffs from the cargo before allowing the convoy
-to depart.
25
When now the convoy was about ready to depart, the British
government raised new objections. It objected to a passenger
on board the "Noordam" whom the British suspected of being
a propogandist in the service of Germany. The real objection,
however, seems to have been that this man was "fanatically
Mohammedan in his opinions" and "likely a dangerous fire-
brand in the Muzelman question." 26  Another British objection
was to certain parts of wireless installation found on board the
"Tabanan" which were partly -of German origin.2 7 The Dutch
government replied that it could not consent to the British
demand that this passenger be not allowed to proceed. The
passenger in question was an official of the Dutch East Indian
government, and the Dutch government, from a thorough investi-
gation into the case, was convinced that the British charges
against him were unfounded. In regard to the parts of wireless
apparatus the Dutch government replied that these were destined
for the East Indian army and navy, were urgently needed by
them and, like most of the Dutch military supplies, were partly
of German and party of Dutch origin.
28
On the 4th of July the Dutch government received word
from the British government that it had withdrawn the last
named objection, and immediately upon receipt of this message
the Convoy proceeded on its voyage.29
21Dutch White Book, p. 9, Note 20. See C of the conditions p, 7.
2 Marine Minister Rambonnet bitterly opposed this concession and
when the Dutch Ministry decided to make the concessions In spite of his
objections, Rambonnet handed his resignation to the Queen, June 20.
The Queen accepted his resignation on the 27th, but on the 29th she
named him as her Adjutant Extraordinary. Japisks, Holland in Welt-
kreig, p. 173.
Dutch White Book, p. 10, Notes 21 and 22.
2W Dutch White Book, Note 19.
IsDutch White Book, p. 10, Note 23.
2 Dutch White Book, p. 3.
KENTuCKY LAw JouAL
II. Tx RuiLE OF INTERNATioNAL LAW WiTH RESPECT TO
NEUTRAL CONVOYS
From the time of the Consolato Del Mare until the middle
of the seventeenth century the belligerent right of visit and
search seems to have gone unquestioned.30 The right of exemp-
tion from search of its merchantmen sailing under convoy was
first asserted by Sweden in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1653. The
Swedish government announced the decision to send out its
merchantmen under convoy by men-of-war whose commanders
would be ordered to resist by force any attempt of a belligerent
warship to visit and search any of the vessels under its convoy.
Because of the short duration of the war no case of attempted
search or of forceful resistance to search arose. At the close of
this war a treaty was concluded between the Dutch United Pro-
vinces and England which contained the provision that the war-
ships of either state would grant protection to all ships belonging
to the other state which were making the same voyage or going
in the same direction. When shortly after England and Spain
were at war the Dutch government claimed exemption from
search for her merchantmen, and though this right was not ad-
mitted by the British, an English squadron commander did
waive the right of search to a convoy under Admiral De Ruyter.
In the negotiations for a new treaty between these two powers
in 1657 the Dutch again attempted to include a provision for the
exemption from visit and search of all vessels under convoy.
The argument for the right of convoy, used by the Dutch repre-
sentative, was very much the same as that used by the Dutch
government in its controversy with the British government
during the World War. The Dutch representative argued that
the convoy gave a better security to the belligerent government
than could be obtained in any other way. However, the new
treaty failed of negotiation.31
The English apparently suspected the Dutch of seeking to
use the right of convoy to win a monopoly of the carrying trade.
20For the history of neutral convoys see: Hugh L. Bellot, Journal
of Comparative LegiNation, 18:260 ff; International LawD Situations,
Naval War College, 1911, ch. II, and Rolin, Le Droit 3oderne de la
Guerre, Chapitre IIL Most treatises on International law contain a
short historical account of the subject. See especially Lawrence, Prin-
ciples of International Law, 669-674.
'3Bellot, op. cit.
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If the Dutch could resist English search at sea by means of
strong convoys much of the carrying trade might be attracted
to the Dutch ships.3 2 For a long time Holland herself when a
belligerent denied to neutrals exemption from search,3 8 but
later, in 1781, granted to neutral vessels exemption from search
if under convoy of warships of their own flag, upon declaration
of the commander of the convoy that the ships carried no con-
traband and were not engaged in unneutral service.34 And
when Dutch commanders resisted visit and search by English
cruisers, of merchantmen under their convoy, the Dutch govern-
mentment supported their action 3 5
The doctrine of convoy found increasing favor with the con-
tinental states. In the latter part of the 18th century, the right
of neutral convoy was inserted as an agreement in many treaties.
In accordance with these treaty agreements the word of the
commander of the convoy was to be accepted and the vessels
under convoy were to be free from visit and search. Such
agreements were found in a number of treaties, as follows:
United States and Holland, 1780; Russia and Denmark, 1782;
United States and Sweden, 1783; United States and Prussia,
1785; Russia and Two Sicilies, 1787; United States and Mor-
roco, 1787; Russia and Portugal, 1787; United States and Tunis,
1787; United States and France, 1800.36 The Convention of
Armed Neutrality of 1800 also contained a provision asserting
the right of neutral convoy. 37
Great Britain steadily opposed any claim to exemption of
the right of visit and search -and continued to exercise this belli-
gerent right. In 1798 a fleet of Swedish merchantmen under
convoy resisted visit and were captured by a British squadron
in the English channel. The vessels were all condemned by
Lord Stowell in his judgment in the case of "The Maria." In
this great decision Lord Stowell held, first, "that the right of
visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, what-
Letter of Secretary Thurloe at the Hague. Thurloe State Papers,
Vol. IV. 203. Quoted by Bellot, op. cit.
1 Declaration of war against France, 1869.
Lawrence, Principles of hdternational Law, p. 670.
"In 1762 and 1780, Bellot, op. cit.
" Treaties of United States, - pp. 328, 725, 903, 1046, 1091. Law-
rence 670, Bellot, op. cit., and Naval War College, International Law
Situations, 1911, pp. 39-42.
IScott, Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800. Appendix, p. 646.
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ever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the de-
stinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned
cruisers of a belligerent nation," secondly, "that the authority
of the sovereign of the neutral country being interposed in any
manner of mere force can not legally vary the rights of a law-
fully commissioned belligerent cruiser," and thirdly, "that the
penalty for the violent contravention of this right is the confis-
cation of the property so withheld from visitation and search."s
3
In the spring of 1800 a Danish convoy of six merchantmen,
under protection of the Danish frigate "Freya," resisted visit
and search by the British and all were seized and captured as
prize. However, the vessels were released and compensation
was made when the King of Denmark agreed to suspend con-
voys.
8 9
However, in 1801, in a treaty with Russia, Great Britain
for the first time since Cromwell and. the last time until the
Declaration of London recognized the right of exemption of
visit and search of neutral vessels under convoy. Under this
treaty privateers were wholly excluded from the right to visit
and search, and in cases of neutral vessels under convoy of a
warship, search could only be made if there were reasons for
suspicion after examination of the papers on board the convoy-
ing vessel. And even then the search could only be made jointly
by both commanders. This convention, which had also been
acceded to by Denmark and Sweden, was annulled in 1807.40
During the course of the nineteenth century no notable con-
troversies arose over the question of convoy. The continental
countries generally favored the right of neutral convoy while
Great Britain as strenuously opposed it. Nothing was said
about convoy in the Declaration of Paris. In several treaties
made between the United States and other countries there were
provisions as to visit and search. The treaty made with Brazil
in 1828 provided that the stipulations in the treaty relative to
the visiting and examining of vessels shall apply only to those
which sail without convoy; and when said vessel shall be under
convoy the verbal declaration of the commander of the convoy,
"1 0. Rob. 340 ff. (1799); Scott, Cases, 1003-1008.
Bellot, op. cit.
C. de Martens, RecueiR, Vol. VII, p. 263. Lawrence, p. 671, Bellot,
op. cit.
NEUTPAL CONVOY IN THE WORLD WAR
on his word of honor, that the vessels under his protection belong
to the nation whose flag he carries ,and when they are bound to
an enemy's port that they have no contraband on board shall be
sufficient.41 Treaties with Columbia, 1846, and Italy, 1871, con-
tained the same provision.42  The Treaty with Haiti of 1864,
which was terminated in 1905, contains a similar but more de-
tailed provision.43 The United States throughout the nineteenth
century claimed the right of exemption of visitation of her
merchantmen when under convoy of her warships, and herself
recognized the right during the Civil War.44 However, the
United States recognized the rule only so far as it applied to
merchant vessels proceeding under convoy to ports not block-
aded.45
Japan also recognized the right of neutral convoy and ap-
plied it in the China-Japanese War, 1894, and again in the
Russo-Japanese in 1904.46 Russia also recognized the right in
her prize regulations of March 27, 1895. 4 7  Italy has recognized
this right in treaties with Central and South American states
and the Italian Mercantile Code has long contained a regulation
to this effect. 48 Spain, in the Spanish-American War, 1898,
also recognized the right of exemption of visit and search of
neutral vessels under convoy of national warships. 4 9 And even
Great Britain, though opposing the doctrine in practice, waived
the right of visit and search of neutral vessels under national
convoy in the Crimean War. 50
At the London Naval Conference, 1908-1909, Great Britain
finally consented to adopt the position of the continental states.
The British and German memoranda alone of all the memoranda
submitted to the conference on the question of convoy, main-
tained that under the existing rules the neutral vessel under
41 Treaties and Conventions, 1776-1909, Vol. I, p. 140.
Naval War College, International Law Situations, p. 40.
"Treaties and Conventions, 1776-1909, p. 938, Vol. I.
"Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. VII, p. 1204.
Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 493. Letter of Mr. Seward, August 12, 1861, to
Dutch Minister.
4ONaval War College, op. cit., 1905, p. 197.
41 Moore, Digest, VII, 493, and Naval War College, op. cit., 1911, p. 39.
4Scott, Declaration of London, p. 51, and Naval War College, op.
cit. 1911, p. 38.
"Naval War College, op. cit., 1911, pp. 38-40.
0Hershey, Note, p. 519; Parl. Blue Book, Misc., No. 4 (1909) p. 25.
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convoy of its own flag was not exempt from visitation.5 1 The
provision in regard to convoy whiel were in the end incorporated
into the Declaration begin by laying down the principle that
"neutral vessels under convoy of their national flag are exempt
from search." 5 2  "The commander of a belligerent warship
may request of the commander of the convoy a written state-
ment of all information as to the character of the vessels and
their cargoes, which could be obtained by visit and search." If
the commander of the warship is not satisfied with the state-
ment, he communicates his suspicions to the commander of the
convoy and it then becomes the duty of the commander of the
convoy to conduct an investigation, but the latter need not per-
mit the presence of the belligerent at the investigation. The
commander of the convoy must furnish the officer of the warship
a copy of the report of the results of the investigation. If the
commander of the convoy is of the opinion that the facts justify
the capture of one or more vessels, he must withdraw his protec-
tion from such vessel or vessels, and allow them to be seized by
the belligerent cruiser.53 In case of differences arising between
the two commanders the belligerent officer can do no more than
make his protest and leave the settlement of the difficulty to
diplomacy. 54
The Dutch convoy to the East Indies is the only case of a
neutral convoy during the 'World War. At the conference of
the three -Scandinavian powers in February, 1915, the possibility
of convoying Scandinavian merchantmen was considered and
the principle of the right of neutral convoy espoused, but the
"Scott, Declaration of London, 1909, pp. 49-52.
2Article 61, Declaration of London, "Neutral vessels under donvoy
of their national flag are exempt from search. The commander of a con-
voy gives, in writing, at the request of the commander of a belligerent
warship, all information as to the character of the vessels and their
cargoes, which could be obtained by visit and search." Scott, p. 127.
Art. 62. Decaration of London, "If the commander of belligerent
warship has reason to suspect that the confidence of the commander of
the convoy' has been abused, he communicates his suspicions to him.
In such a case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to conduct
an investigation. He must record the result of such investigation in a
report, of which a copy is furnished to the officer of the warship. If,
in the opinion of the commander of the convoy, the facts thus stated
justify the capture of one or more vessels, the protection of the convoy
must be withdrawn from such vessels." Scott, p. 127.
" See Report of the British Delegates-Scott, Declaration of London,
p. 250, and "the General Repbrt to the Conference," Naval War College,
International Law Topics, 1909, pp. 141-143, for report see Art. 62.
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policy was never put into actual practice. 55 Germany, in 1915,
proposed to the United States that they convoy their merchant
ships traversing the English seat of maritime war but the United
States government ignored the proposal.58 However, the action
of the United States in 1917 of placing armed guards on mer-
chant ships partakes somewhat of the. nature of a convoy.
The general historical trend as reflected in practice and the
increasing number of treaties recognizing the right up to the
World War was clearly in the direction of the recognition of
ihe right of neutral convoy. This general trend culminating in
articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration of London has already been
reviewed, but owing to the fact that the Declaration of London
was never ratified the question was never really settled.
Turning to the publicists one discovers that the continental
writers generally uphold the right of neutral convoy while the
English and also the early American writers generally deny the
right. Among the more recent English and American writers
are found many who uphold the right,57 and some who deny it. 5s
The leading British decision on neutral convoy, "The
Maria," has already been cited. English writers often refer to
the dissenting opinion of Justice Story in "The Nereide" as
confirming the decision of Lord Stowell iii "The Maria." In
this opinion Justice Story said, "The law deems the sailing
under convoy as an act per se inconsistent with neutrality, as a
premeditated act to oppose, if practicable, the right of search,
and therefore attributing to such preliminary act the full effect
of resistance.'" 59 *But the decision in "The Nereide" rests upon
the right of a neutral to place his goods on board an enemy
armed merchantman, and not upon the right of neutral convoy,
so that Justice Story's statement could have a bearing only on
?Jorse Ye~low Book, p. 22.
60A. J. I. L., Spec. Supp., Vol. 9, p. 95. Note, Feb. 16, 1915.
"Among those who contend that neutral convoy exempts the con-
voyed vessel from visitation and search are Halleck, p. 615; Woolsay,
pp. 363-364; Westlake, 11, 300-301; Lawrence, pp. 669-672; Oppenheim,
II, 535-536; Borchard's Fiore, pp. 685-686; Hershey, pp. 518-519 and
notes; Fenwick, pp. 550-551; Hyde, II, 457-458; Bluntschli, par. 824-825;
Hefter, par. 180; Masse, II, 271; Rolin Book 3, Chap. 7; Calvo, I, 206,
par. 2969. The Institute of International Law twice declared in favor
of the principle, Annuaires, 1882, p. 48; 1913, p. 181.
"Kent, I, 162; Dana's Wheaton, Note 242; Hall, pp. 723-730, Hol-
land, pp. 2, 4; Philllmore, par. 338.
"C ranch, 440.
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enemy convoy and with reference to that, it was merely obiter
dicta.
III. ComPATIBmrrY OF TE DUTCH CONVOY WITH THE RULE OF
IN TERNATIONAL LAW v
From a "positivist" point of -view it may be doubted
whether the right of neutral convoy had been definitely estab-
lished at the time of the World War, owing to the failure of the
ratification of the Declaration of London. And the diplomatic
controversy between Holland and Great Britain did. nothing to
help in settling the question, since the Dutch government did
not press the legal question involved after the first note. But
assuming that Articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration were merely
declaratory of international law, an examination of the compati-
bility of the demanded right of the convoy with the provisions
of the Declaration may be both profitable and interesting.
According to the report of the commmittee which drafted
these articles, the underlying principle upon which the articles
are based is that the neutral government undertakes the respon-
sibility of protecting those belligerent rights which the belli-
gerent heretofore secured by the exercise of visit and. search on
the high seas. The neutral, therefore, assumes responsibility
for the supervision of the vessels it undertakes to convoy. In
the words of the drafting committee, "the neutral government
undertakes to afford the belligerents every guaranty that the
vessels convoyed shall not take advantage of the protection ac-
corded to them in order to do anything inconsistent with their
neutrality, as, for example, to carry contraband, render un-
neutral service to the belligerent, or attempt to break blockade.
There is need, therefore, that a genuine supervision should be
exercised from the outset over the vessels which are to be con-
voyed; and that supervision must be continued thruout the voy-
age. "60
The Dutch government on its own initiative undertook to
give all the guaranties laid down in the committee's report,6 '
but as might be expected, this did not remove all possibilities of
10 Scott, Dec~aration of Lonfon, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, p. 178.
"Dutch White Book, Note 1, p. 3.
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controversy. It only served to center the controversy about the
character of the persons and the goods to be placed on board the
convoyed vessels.
It is doubtful whether the status of neutral convoy under
international law has been at all changed as a result of the prac-
tice of the World War. Great Britain waived the right of
search only on the understanding that it was an exceptional con-
cession which could not be treated as a precedent for similar con-
cessions in the future. And it ought also to be especially noted
that the Dutch Convoy was of an unusual character. It was in
no sense an ordinary commercial convoy but a government con-
voy from the metropolitan country to its colonial government
in eminent need of military and other governmental material.
So that even if the Dutch Convoy should set a precedent for the
future, it would set a precedent only for a convoy very restricted
in its nature.
IV. DUTCH CONVOY AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SOLUTION OF T E
PROBLEM OF VISIT AND SEARCH UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
Though some modification of the right of search is impera-
tive, it is very questionable whether the method employed in the
Dutch Convoy is a solution of the perplexing problem, as one
American writer asserts that it is. 62 In the first place, it is to
be noted that the Dutch Convoy was'not in any sense a commer-
cial or merchant convoy. It was a government convoy and con-
cerned a governmental relationship between a mother country
and its colonial government in pressing need of supplies. It
may well be doubted whether the British would have waived the
right of search had it been an ordinary merchant convoy. Nor
is this all. There are very sharp practical limitations on the
use of convoy. The expense of supervision on the parm of the
neutral government, the different rates of speed of the vessels
in the convoy, the cost of the convoy to the government which
has to furnish the convoying warships, all make the convoy im-
practicable because of its expense. In fact, the difficulty with
which the Dutch Government could get bunker coal prevented
it from even considering an ordinary merchant convoy.63  The
Graham, American Journal International Law, Vol 17, p. 704.
6 See statement of Dutch Minisier of Marine in First Chamber of
the States General, British Par. Paper, Note 4.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
extra costs to the Dutch government entailed in the sending of
the convoy was 1,907,500 florins, or about $763,000.64
The effect of the World War on neutral convoy can best be
summed up in the words of Dr. J. H. W. Verzyl, a leadifig Dutch
authority on international law:
"It would appear as if convoy in the old meaning of the term in
prize-law, has lapsed into permanent disuse. With the uncertainty
of the -comprehension of the contraband concept in Telation to the
standards of enemy destination, and the complexity of modern com-
merce the remedy will often ap pear worse than the disorder.-the
neutral state cannot assum~e responsibility for the innocent character
of the cargo, and conceivably differences in understanding might
arise between the commander of the convoy and the commander of
the -belligerent warship, which might lead to dangerous conflicts." "
A. VAN-D BSCE,
Assistant Professor of Political Science.
University of Kentucky
Dutch Whte Book, p. 11.
Het Prijshecht tegenover neutralen in den Wereldoorlog v'an, 1914,
316. Hyde, II, 628, suggests governmental guarantees of cargoes. It is
questionable whether neutral govern~nents will assume this responsi-
bility.
